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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine John, a United States citizen, who decided to reward himself with
an exotic trip. He picked a foreign land he always dreamed of visiting. He
researched the country and found out that it was a party to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),' which meant that, just in case he
ran into trouble and was arrested, he would be notified of his right to contact
the American consulate for assistance.2 Armed with this knowledge, John
eagerly started his exotic adventure. After a few glorious days, his worst fears
came true: the foreign authorities found a dead man in his hotel and decided
he must be the murderer. John was arrested and thrown in jail with no
notification of his VCCR Article 36 rights.3 John did not speak the language
and when someone finally came to see him who could speak a little English,
he promptly informed him of his knowledge of the VCCR rights. To John's
surprise, the man explained to him in broken English that his country refused
to honor those rights because ofrecent and continuous violations by the United
States in regards to the VCCR rights of foreign nationals from his country
arrested in the United States.4 Hearing this, John's hopes were dashed. Even
if the U.S. authorities found out John was there, it may take years to free him
and by then, he may already have been convicted and executed. If only the
United States honored its obligations, John's exotic adventure would not have
turned into a living nightmare.
This story reflects exactly what some observers believe could happen to
any U.S. citizen living or traveling abroad if the United States continues to
violate its obligations under the VCCR' Through a courtroom showdown in
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 [hereinafter
VCCR].
2 See id. at art. 36. Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR provides:

If he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, inprison, custody
or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay.
The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph.

Id.
See id.
See, e.g., Faulder v. Johnson, 119 S. Ct. 2363 (1999); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998).
5 See, e.g., USA Pressesfor ConsularAccess to Detailed American, BRIT. BROAD. CORP.,
July 8, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File (discussing a situation
'
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ)," this note will follow the events of one
such violation and the other country's attempt to obtain assurances from the
United States that it will not violate its obligations again.
After two of its nationals, Walter and Karl LaGrand, were arrested and
subsequently executed without ever being told of their Article 36 rights by
U.S. authorities, 7 Germany filed a case on March 2, 1999, in the ICJ against
the United States complaining of violations of the VCCR. The ICJ issued
Provisional Measures Orders to stay the execution of Walter LaGrand;
however, U.S. authorities failed to honor the Order.8 The decision not to stay
the execution pursuant to the Order9 indicated to other countries that the
United States did not take its treaty obligations seriously.
After the trial, the ICJ declared that the United States violated the VCCR
as applied to the facts of the case. No problems were found with the ICJ's
jurisdiction over the matter, and the ICJ deemed the United States guilty of
violating the Provisional Measures Order." Due to the importance of comity
and reliability in the international community, this note argues that the United
States must not ignore the ruling. Instead, it should take all steps needed to

where North Korea blocked the United States' access to its foreign nationals detained in North

Korea).

" See International Court of Justice History (visited Oct. 16, 2000), at http://icj-cij.org/
icjwww/ igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm. The International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ] was set up by Charter of the United Nations in 1945. It sits in The Hague,
Netherlands, and acts as a world court.
7 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing facts of the
case).
' See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Request for
Indication of Provisional Measures (F.RG. v. U.S.) (Provisional Measures cases) (Mar. 3,
1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm, reprinted in 38 l.L.M. 308 [hereinafter

Order].
" See Christopher Van Der Waerden, Death andDiplomacy: Paraguayv.UnitedStates and
the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1631, 1648 (1999). "The
[Supreme] Court's decision [in Breardv. Greene] undermines the United States' position that
it takes its treaty obligations seriously and its ability to demand the same from other nations."
The United States invoked a VCCR claim against Iran before the ICJ during the Iran hostage
crisis in 1979. When Iran ignored the ICJ's order to release American hostages, "President
Carter 'accused Iran of showing contempt.., for the entire international structure for securing
the peaceful resolution of differences among nations' and called for the community of nations
to 'support the legal machinery it has established, so that.., the International Court of Justice
will continue to be relevant. The United States now has shown the same contempt. . ." Id. at
1650.
10 See generally LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Final Judgment (June 27, 2001), at http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igusjudgment/igusframe.htm [hereinafter Final Judgment].
1 See id.
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rectify the situation of VCCR notification in America in order to save its
reputation and protect its citizens.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations (VCCR)
The Vienna Convention commenced and ratified a treaty in 1963 to
formalize the procedure for notifying a foreign national's consul when that
national was accused of a crime in another country.' 2 The VCCR aids
nationals whom are arrested in foreign countries when the sending countries
are a party to it, including approximately 3,000 Americans a year."3 Without
being able to talk to a consul, most foreign nationalswould not know the best
route to take with their case since the great majority of people do not know the
laws and procedures of judicial systems in other countries."' Consuls protect
their citizens in a number of critical ways including translation, protection
against abuse, and ensuring the physical conditions of confinement are
adequate."
B. The InternationalCourt ofJustice (IC)
In a claim alleging a violation of the VCC1, the ICJ hears the case and
makes a decision that is supposed to be binding under international law.'6
Under Article 59 of the ICJ statute and Article 94(1) of the United Nations
Charter, a member state of the United Nations is obligated to comply with a

12

See Shana F. Marbury, Breard v. Greene: InternationalHuman Rights and the Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 505 (1999).
" David Stout, The Nation: Do as We Say. Not as We Do; US. Executions Draw Scornfrom
Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4 at 4 (discussing the aftermath of the execution of
Paraguayan citizen, Angel Breard).
,4 See Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of
Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719 (1995).
's See id.; see also John Sims & Linda Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging
Importance of the Vienna Convention in Censular Relations as a Defense Tool, available at
http://20970.38.3/Champion/articles/98Sep0l.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000) (explaining
consuls are invaluable in regard to "any pertinent cultural differences" the attorney should know
about in mounting a good defense).
16 See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
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decision of the ICJ in any case in which it is a party.'7 It follows that a claim
in the ICJ would afford the best relief; however, too many nations, including
the United States, consider the United Nations not to be an authoritative body.
Similarly, decisions of the ICJ are not always viewed as binding. 8
C. FederalRepublic of Germany v. United States in the ICJ
1. Case Facts and ProceduralHistory
Karl and Walter LaGrand, German nationals, were convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death in Arizona in 1987. " The LaGrands were never
notified of their right to consular assistance under the VCCR by U.S.
authorities. Five years later, in 1992, the LaGrands informed Germany of their
death sentences since neither Arizona state nor federal officials had informed
the German consulate of their situation.20 Karl LaGrand was executed on
February 24, 1999, and on March 2, 1999, Germany filed an application to
initiate proceedings in the ICJ against the United States for violations of the
VCCR, as Arizona officials admitted they did not inform the LaGrands of their
consular rights.2 ' Germany waited seven years to file an application in the ICJ
because other measures were being taken to spare the LaGrands' lives. 2
Germany requested a Provisional Measures Order to protect its diplomatic
rights as sending state of the LaGrands under Article 41 of the Statute of the
ICJ.2 The ICJ issued an Order on March 3, 1999 which stated the United
States "should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand
is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings. 24 The
Arizona Clemency Board had previously voted two-to-one to recommend the
governor of Arizona stay the execution; 25 however, when the United States

17U.N. CHARTER art. 94,

para. 1; I.C.J. STATUTE, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1031,

U.N.T.S. No. 993, as amended T.I.A.S. Nos. 5827, 6529, 7739 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].

"SSee Cara S. O'Driscoll, The Execution ofForeignNationalsin Arizona: Violations ofthe

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 323, 338 (2000).
'9See
20 See
21 See

State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
International Court of Justice Press Communiqui 99/09, Mar. 3, 1999, LaGrand case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104 (Application Instituting Proceedings of March 2) [hereinafter
Press Communiqu6 99/09].
22 See infra Part III (discussing measures taken by Germany).
' See ICJ Statute, supra note 17, at art. 41(1) (Article 41(1) of the Statute gives the ICJ the
power to indicate provisional measures); see Press Communiqud 99/09 supra note 21.
2
2

Order, supranote 8.
See 2ND ROUNDUP: Arizona Orders Execution of German Murderer, DEUTSCHE
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Supreme Court left discretion to the governor of Arizona whether to comply
with the ICJ order or execute LaGrand,26 Walter LaGrand was executed in the
gas chamber that same day."
2. The Oral Arguments Before the IC
a. Introductory Summaries of Each Parties'Arguments
Germany asked the Court to adjudge and declare that the United States
violated the rights of Article 36(1) and (2), the United States violated its
international legal obligations to comply with the March 3, 1999 order, and the
United States should provide Germany with appropriate apologies and
assurances for non-repetition.
The United States admitted breaching Article 36(1)(b) by not giving
notification to the LaGrands, but it asked the ICJ to recognize the United
States' apology to Germany and its undertaking of "substantial" measures to
prevent recurrence as adequate remedies for the breach, and that all other
claims by Germany should be dismissed. Also, the United States asserted
that all of Germany's other claims, aside from the one concerning Article
36(l)(b), were speculative and outside jurisdictional limits.
b. JurisdictionandAdmissibility Arguments
Germany argued that the ICJ had proper authority over the case according
to the Optional Protocol of the VCCR and all of its claims were admissible.3
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 3, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (denying
despite two-to-one vote in favor of clemency).
"' See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111 (1999).
27 See Roger Cohen, US. Execution of German Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1999, at
A 14.
2 This paper will not attempt to summarize the written briefs in the case, known as the

Memorial and Counter-Memorial, since all of the important issues are contained in the oral
arguments with citations to the briefs where appropriate.
29See Verbatim Record 2000/30 and Verbatim Record 2000/30-Translation, § VIII, Nov.
16,2000, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusfrane.htm (last visited Nov. 22,2000)
[hereinafter Record 30].
'0 Verbatim Record 2000/31 and Verbatim Record 2000/31-Translation, 1 7.16 http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idockets/igus/iguscr/igus-icr-toc.html (Nov. 14, 2000) [hereinafter
Record 31 ].
3' See Verbatim Record 2000/26 and Verbatim Record 2000/26-Translation, 4 http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguscrligus-r2000-26.html (Nov. 13,2000) [hereinafter
Record 26].
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Germany asserted that all of the legal issues it raised were of continuing
relevance, for the situation in the case has happened repeatedly and will
continue to "haunt us in the future" if the ICJ does not stop it.32
Germany further declared its "choice of timing" acceptable because no
uniform statute of limitations or clear requirements governed international
court.33 Further, Germany could only have acted with the timing it did since
it first attempted other avenues of relief.' Germany asked the Court to decide
that jurisdiction was appropriate and every claim was admissible."
The United States stated, like Germany, that jurisdiction in the case rested
upon the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, but added that "[t]his jurisdiction is
limited to disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of this
Convention and nothing else."' The United States maintained that even if
jurisdiction was found, the claims were inadmissible because Germany failed
to meet requirements of exhaustion of local remedies. The United States
stated that a remedy existed at the trial stage to enable consular notification
and it was unexhausted. According to the United States, no entitlement existed
in international law that required the United States to provide an additional
recourse, and "rules pertaining to procedural default do not violate any
7 Nonetheless, another remedy
international obligations of the United States.""1
for the LaGrands existed since "[u]ntimely claims are still allowed if
individuals can demonstrate prejudice to their case and [show] a good reason
for failing to raise the claim in a timely manner."'"
Further, the United States pointed to Germany's insistence on the benefit
of similar rules like the United States' procedural default rule when it was a
defendant, and Germany, for a remedy, only apologized to the United States
for its violations of Article 36.39 Also, the United States wanted the Court to

52 Id. at
3 (listing examples of other highly publicized cases of foreign nationals being
executed in the United States whom were never informed of their rights under the Vienna
Convention including Angel Breard, Stanley Faulder, and most recently, Miguel Flores who was
executed just four days before this hearing).
a See id. at 26; see infra Part III (discussing other attempts at relief).
3' See infra Part lll.B (discussing other attempts at relief).
" See Record 30, supra note 29, § VIII.
' Verbatim Record 2000/28 and Verbatim Record 2000/28-Translation,
3.1, Nov. 13,
2000 (visited Nov. 22, 2000) http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/iguscrligus-cr200028.html (Nov. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Record 28].
37 Id. at 3.26 (adding at 3.28, "When a person fails ... to sue in national courts before
a statute of limitations has expired, the claim is both procedurally barred in national courts and
inadmissible in international tribunals for failure to exhaust local remedies").
as Record 31, supra note 30, 1.12.
3 See Record 28, supra note 36,1 3.46 (citing specific examples).
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"bear in mind that its decision in this case will inevitably have far-reaching
implications, and [to] reject Germany's invitation to give the [VCCR] a stateof-the-an meaning that the 165-odd [s]tates party to it never contemplated.' '40
c. Disputed and UndisputedFacts
Upon arrest, Arizona authorities did not inform either of the LaGrands of
their Article 36 rights to consular assistance. Germany stated that, at the latest,
Arizona officials knew of the brothers' German citizenship in April 1982."
The LaGrand brothers informed German consular offices in 1992 after
learning of their rights from two other German inmates whom had been
informed by United States authorities. 2 By that time, the LaGrands were
already tried and sentenced to death and the lack of consular advice was never
mentioned by the attorneys or anyone else. The federal habeas corpus claim
filed by the LaGrands for the Article 36 violations was considered procedurally defaulted, as the issue was not raised in state proceedings. 3
The United States countered Germany's assessment of the facts, contending
that it not only thought the LaGrands were United States citizens from their
appearance, but based on the brothers' own representations. 44 The United
States asserted there was other "strong evidence that the LaGrands themselves

thought that they were or might be [United States] citizens at the time of their
'

arrest." "
The United States conceded that state prison officials learned of the
LaGrands' citizenship after they were transferred to state prison, but the
United States could not determine an exact date when prison officials learned
this fact. Not until 1984 did United States prison records clearly reflect the
LaGrands' German citizenry. 46 According to the United States, nothing

40

Record 31, supra note 30, 4.14.

4,See Record 26, supra note 31, § 11,12. See id. (taking this position from the presentence

reports compiled in April that affirmatively listed the LaGrands as German citizens); see Record
28, supranote 36, 2.12. A presentence report contains information about the crime, the social
history of the convicted person, and other information relevant to sentencing. Id.
42 See Record 26, supra note 31, § 11,12.
43See id.
See Record 28, supra note 36, 2.7. The arrest sheet for Karl LaGrand, which is filled
out with information provided by the arrested person, was checked indicating "U.S. citizen."
In Walter's case, "U.S. citizen" was not checked but "neither was the line for nationality if not
a US citizen filled out." Id.
45 Id. at 2.8 (including the fact that both brothers' fathers were United States servicemen,
which was known by the brothers and the United States authorities).
46 See id.
at 2.10.
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excused Germany's decision to wait seven years to institute proceedings on the
LaGrands' behalf.
d. Article 36 Violations
Germany wanted the ICJ to judge that the central problem in the case was
that the United States read Article 36 of the VCCR in a "very narrow and
restrictive way."' 7 Germany read Article 36 differently. 48 Germany understood Article 36, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) as stating: a right of consular
communication and access; a right to be informed of the right to consular
communication "without delay"; and, a right for the consulate to arrange legal
representation for the foreign national, respectively.49 Germany further
explained that the "without delay" aspect was crucial because when violated,
the other Article 3 6 rights became "irrelevant" and "meaningless" in practice.50
Germany also believed the United States violated Article 36(2) because it
regarded the implementation of the Article 36(1) rights." Germany argued
that Article 36(2) put the receiving state under a specific obligation to make52
sure its laws did not hinder the full effect to be given Article 36(1) rights.
Germany claimed that, specifically, the United States rule of procedural
default violated this obligation.53
The United States argued the opposing view that the VCCR did not require
states to provide remedies in their respective criminal justice systems when

17Record

26, supra note 31, § IV,

2.

" See 1d. ("In contrast, Germany maintains that Article 36 provides a regime that guarantees
foreigners effective access to consular advice, and second, that this regime also includes a
minimum standard for national laws and regulations to render the right to consular communication meaningful and effective").
49 See id. at 3.
s' See id. (Germany asserts that"without delay" means immediately so the consulate can be
involved in all aspects of the foreign national's case at the trial and pre-trial stages. Further,
Germany thinks the United States is mistaken in believing the rights of Article 36 can be
preserved when consular notification is postponed).
s See id.; see also VCCR, supra note 1, 101. Article 36(2) states:
The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are
intended.
Id.
' See Record 26, supra note 31, § IV, 4.
" See id.
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foreign nationals were not informed of their consular notification rights.54
According to the United States, the text, history, and state practice under the
VCCR did not support Germany's suggestion otherwise." The United States
averred that it did all that was required of it: "The United States has investigated the alleged breach; apologized to Germany; and undertaken a significant
broad effort to improve its compliance with the requirements of Article 36.""
Moreover, the United States contended that once it had confirmed the
breach of Article 36(1)(b), it "expressed the regrets and extended the official
apologies of the United States to Germany, and [the United States] advised
Germany in detail of the steps being taken in the United States to prevent
future recurrences.""7 In its apology, the United States told Germany it took
both the situation and consular notification seriously.5"
e. United States Efforts to Curb Vienna Treaty Violations
In a rough estimate taken by German consulates in the United States, less
than twenty-five percent of German nationals arrested in the United States
have been informed of their Article 36 rights.5 9 According to Germany, it
received a series of letters from the United States all expressing apologies for
Article 36 violations and it no longer felt mere apologies were acceptable.'
Efforts that the United States took to address this problem include the
publication of a brochure on consular rights and a pocket card both of which
were distributed to relevant authorities." In its closing argument, the United
States added:
The United States has embarked on what we see as a longterm, permanent effort to address the question of compliance
with Article 36. We do not need any additional requirement
of compliance with Article 36, because we fully understand
s See Record 28, supra note 36, 4.2.
See id. at 4.14-4.40.
'6 Id. at 4.1.
"

17 Id. at
4.4 (stating United States action was consistent with prior practice of both itself
and Germany).

58 See id. at

4.5.

9 See Record 26, supranote 31, § II, 8. The estimate did not include undetected breaches.
See id.
60 See id. at
§ II,

11.
6' See Record 28, supranote 36, 4.5 (estimating it has distributed "over 60,000 copies of
the brochure, and over 400,000 copies of the pocket card to federal, state, and local law
enforcement and judicial officials throughout the United States").
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and our states fully understand that it has the force of law in
the United States and can be implemented directly. 2
f Article 36 as Individual,Human Rights
Germany plead its argument: "[the] right to information under Article 36
of the [VCCR] constitutes an individual, indeed, a human right . ... "
Germany argued this statement with three points: (1) Article 36 refers to
individual rights by using the words "his rights"'" in its language, (2) the
preamble of the VCCR which says it is "not to benefit individuals, 65 is
unrelated to Article 36, and (3) "the purpose of [Article 36(1)] is to give
' 6
individuals the rights to inform their consulate or to abstain from so doing. "
The United States responded that the VCCR was not formally conceived
as a text guaranteeing human rights, nor did the academic world regard it as
such. 6 ' The United States also argued that the right to be informed was not
included in the bundle of human rights. The United States' main theory was
that the VCCR could not be a human right because anyone was entitled to
human rights, but only nationals of countries that were parties to the VCCR
have Article 36 rights."9
The United States argued, "a whole series of assumptions is interposed
between information and actual assistance: (a) the person arrested must
express desire to contact the consulate; (b) the consulate must react... [and]
the consulate must be willing .... [which] will not always be the case; (c) any
assistance provided must actually be useful for the defense."' 9 The United
States concluded that it would be "stretching... to base a fundamental right
on these possibilities, which are entirely optional."70

Id. at 4.100.
Record 26, supra note 31, § VI, !.
6 Id. at § VI, 1 3 (citing VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36).
6 See VCCR, supra note 1, at 79.
' Record 26, supra note 31, § VI, 3.
67 See Verbatim Record 2000/29 and Verbatim Record 2000/29-Translation
6.8ff, Nov.
14, 2000, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idockettigusigusframe.htm (visited Nov. 22, 2000)
[hereinafter Record 29].
" Seeid. at 6.15.
62
63

69 Id. at
6.22 (citing Stater Apelt, 861 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, Apelt v.
Arizona, 513 U.S. 834 (1994), a recent United States case in which Germany was able to provide
the accused with the assistance it was unable to provide in the case of the LaGrand brothers; the
Apelt defendants are now awaiting execution in Arizona).
70 Id. at 623.
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g. ProvisionalMeasures Order
Germany stated that the Order asked the United States simply for time and
this Order was binding.71 Germany concluded that "provisional measures ...
are indeed legal decisions.., implied by the logic of urgency and by the need
to safeguard the effectiveness of the proceedings, [and, therefore,] they
accordingly create genuine legal obligations on the part of those to whom they
are addressed."72
The United States directed the Court to the specific language of the March
3, 1999 order that stated the United States "should take all measures at its
disposal"'73 and used the word "should" more than once.74 The United States
explained that the term "should" was "deliberately used in various international instruments to indicate that a principle or statement is not intended to be
legally binding."7 The United States contended that whether the Court had
authority to issue a binding provisional measures order or not, the procedures7
indicated by the ICJ order's own terms was "not binding in character., 1
Furthermore, whatever the character, the United States believed it complied
with the proper procedures. The United States asserted that it took every
reasonable step possible
in the short time under the extreme circumstances in
77
which it had to act.

7' See Verbatim Record 2000/27

and Verbatim Record 2000/27-Translation, §IX 1,Nov.

13,2000, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igusligusframe.htm (last visited Nov. 22,2000)

[hereinafter Record 27].
72 Id. at 38. Adding at 54, that,
It is clear, therefore, that Germany's rights to secure compliance by the
United States with its obligations towards it, and the rights which it exercises
on behalf of its nationals through diplomatic protection, constitute evidence
of a direct link: between the life of one of its nationals and a legal interest
specific to Germany.
Id.

13

See Order,supra note 8.

74 See Record 29, supra note 67,11 7.4-7.5.

' Id. atI 7.5 (comparing the order inthe LaGrand case to an order the ICJ issued in another
of its cases where the court used the word "must" instead of "should").
76 See id. at 7.41.
" See id. (pointing out at 7.17 that the order was not asked for by Germany until after
business hours on March 2, 1999 and the order was not received in the Office of the Legal
Advisor of the State Department in Washington until within 3 hours of the scheduled execution

time).
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h. Remedies Sought by Germany
Germany felt the safeguards it asked for were necessary "where there
existed a real, clearly established danger ofrepetition ofbreaches.... s Germany
argued there was no real end to the United States' pattern of breaching,
apologizing, and then promising to do everything it could to prevent future
breaches. Germany asked for effective review and remedies for criminal
convictions that were impaired by Article 36 violations, especially in death
penalty cases. Germany wanted the United States to meet tougher
require79
ments to ensure nationals would receive their consular rights.
The United States agreed that it failed in its obligation to inform the
LaGrand brothers of their right to consular notification, but repeated that it has
apologized to Germany for this indiscretion. Nonetheless, the United States
asserted that "no deprivation of Germany's right to provide consular
assistance, under... Article 36 to Karl or Walter LaGrand" occurred. 0 No
breach occurred because the United States did not interfere with Germany once
assistance began.
3. ICJ Case Outcome
The majority of the ICJ found for Germany on all claims."' By fourteen
votes to one, the ICJ found the United States breached its obligations to
Germany and the LaGrands under Article 36, paragraphs I and 2, by not
informing the LaGrands of their rights without delay and by not permitting the
review and reconsideration of their sentences.82 By thirteen votes to one, the
ICJ found the United States breached its obligation under the Provisional
Measures Order by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure Walter
LaGrand was not executed." The court unanimously held that the United
States's commitment to ensure implementation of its obligations under Article
36 must be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a general assurance of

'

Record 27, supra note 71, 123.

See id. at M32-34 (adding at 33, that "the U.S. simply cannot rely on the status quo of
its internal law as a justification for failure to comply with its obligation to provide appropriate
safeguards where such steps are necessary"). Germany leaves the choice of means of the
safeguards to the United States, see id.
So Record 29, supranote 67, 15.6.
S See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 1128.
52 See id.
" See id.
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non-repetition. 4 Finally, the court found fourteen to one that should German
citizens be sentenced to severe penalties without their rights under Article 36
having been respected, the United States, by means of its own choosing, shall
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation.8 5

Il. ANALYSIS
Many commentators wrestled with the issues raised in the ICJ proceedings
and most concluded that the ICJ had authority to rule on the case and should
find for Germany on all claims.8 6 The ICJ decision will be of great significance to all parties to the VCCR. In this analysis, both countries' arguments
will be examined against the final ICJ decision as well as consequences of the
ICJ's decision.
A. Jurisdictionand Admissibilityfor the VCCR Claims
Every year, many foreign nationals arrested in the United States are denied
consular access. Likewise, many Americans arrested abroad are denied this
right. The ICJ needed to take jurisdiction in the case in order to save the
Article 36 rights of notification of the VCCR. Since the worldwide notification problem would not remedy itself, the ICJ likely comprehended the need
to set standards for the consular notifications process and for subsequent
violations to it. The ICJ fulfilled this need by reaching a decision on the
merits in the case.
The ICJ held that a State party to a treaty, which creates individual rights,
may take up the case of one of its nationals and institute international judicial
proceedings on behalf of that national on the basis of a general jurisdictional
clause in such a treaty. 7 Further, the ICJ held that since it decided it had
jurisdiction over the treaty dispute between the parties, the Court also had
jurisdiction over issues arising directly out of that dispute, including deciding

" See id.
85 See id.
8 See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty
Violation, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697, 697 (1998). It should be noted here that many of these
commentators began writing on this subject after the Breard situation in 1998 when Paraguay
sued the United States in the ICJ. All of those comments are equally applicable to the LaGrand
situation since the violations alleged and procedures taken are virtually the same. The
provisional measures orders in both cases were worded exactly the same.
87 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, at 42.
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whether an order indicating measures which seek to preserve the rights of the
States to this dispute had been complied with.m Jurisdiction over the dispute
regarding the appropriate remedies was proper as it was a dispute arising out
of the interpretation or application of the treaty."
The ICJ cannot compel sovereign states to alter their domestic laws. It can
only ask the states to comply with their treaty obligations." One might infer
that the United States applies a double standard to ICJ jurisdiction. As a
plaintiff, jurisdiction exists; as a defendant, it does not. As a high profile case,
an opportunity existed for the ICJ to assert its authority over international
agreements while at the media forefront and the Court took full advantage of
this opportunity by finding had jurisdiction over the case and over the United
States as defendant.
B. When are Article 36 Rights Violated?
"Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen
in law but that are elusive to the grasp." ' Article 36 rights in the United States
are akin to those ghosts. Foreign nationals have a legal right to notification,
but the United States will not enforce this right upon its states. Therefore,
Article 36 rights of notice elude foreign nationals arrested in the United States.
The ICJ noted the importance of the VCCR Article 36 rights when it stated,
"the unimpeded conduct of consular relations, which have also been established between peoples since ancient times... [is important in] promoting the
development of friendly nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for
aliens resident in the territories of other states ....92 VCCR rights can only
be given effect by the respective domestic laws of nationals.
1. Article 36 in Domestic Law
One observer pointed out that VCCR rights cannot be set aside by domestic
law; however, "[t]he nature of [the rights in America] depends upon the status

"See id. at 45.
9 See id. at 48.
90See generally ICJ Statute, supra note 21.
" The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419,433 (1921).
92

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Counselor Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),

1979 I.C.J. 7, 20.
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of the treaty in the United States."9 This status of the VCCR in the United
States underlies the concerns Germany raised before the ICJ.
The ICJ's ruling places pressure on the U.S. federal government to uncover
the authority to enforce compliance with the VCCR on the separate states.
"[The United States'] constitutional law is clear: the treaty-makers may make
supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, and notions of states'
rights should not be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of
treaty obligations."9' Treaty obligations directly apply to state and local
governments."S The framers of the U.S. Constitution gave the federal
government authority to compel states to comply with treaties in an effort to
correct problems of state officials violating international treaties." Yet the
United States continually entrusts the individual states with fulfilling treaty
obligations and provisional measures ordered by the ICJ. 97 This practice
presents a "conundrum" for the United States regarding Article 36 of the
VCCR because the individual states have primary responsibility for arresting
and trying criminals and, therefore, are most likely to be the ones violating
Article 36; but it is the federal government that will have to "face the
consequences" of a diplomatic incident or an ICJ trial over a violation.98 Such
an accident occurred in the LaGrand situation. Arizona officials violated the
treaty, but the United States federal government had to defend itself in
international court. The United States should seek to curb this problem as
much as Germany wants to see it stopped.
2. Article 36 Rights as FundamentalRights
The United States has declined to view the Article 36 right to notification
of consular assistance as a fundamental right." It would rather view the failure
of notification as merely one factor for the national to use in demonstrating

9' William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 288 (1998).
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
392 (1998) (stating this as the "nationalist view").
See Aceves, supra note 93, at 294.
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breardand The FederalPowertoRequire Compliancewith
IC OrdersofProvisionalMeasures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 684 (1998).
97

See Aceves, supranote 93, at 523 (remarking that this practice is "disquieting").

"' See Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against JudicialInvolvement
in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 317

(1999).
" See id. at 319.
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that the criminal process was unfair;'" however, the burden of proving fairness
should rest upon the U.S. state trying the foreign national because "the burden
is on the government to make the notification in the first place."' 0'1 Placing the
burden of proving prejudice on the foreign national is one way the U.S.
criminaljustice system infringes upon the protections set forth in the VCCR.102
While the ICJ should not force the United States to change this practice, it
decided the United States implements the VCCR unsatisfactorily and
pressured the United States to make necessary changes. The ICJ declared the
U.S. procedural default rule did not, in itself, violate Article 36; however,
under the circumstances of the case, "the procedural default rule had the effect
of preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this article are intended,' and thus violated paragraph 2
of Article 36." 103 Thus, the procedural default rule provided insufficient
protections under Article 36.
3. The Meaningof Without Delay
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion in
1999 that discussed the meaning of "without delay" in the VCCR.'0 4 Mexico
requested this advisory opinion after it encountered difficulties with the United
States in regard to United States violations of the VCCR. After it heard
arguments explaining the purpose of Article 36 rights to consular assistance,
the court concluded that "the information must be communicated at the time
the person is first deprived of liberty, and in any event before the person
provides her or his first statement to the authorities."'0 5 The approach taken
by the court appeared consistent with the prevailing theory as to the VCCR

'0 See id.

10'See Linda Jane Springrose, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens

UnderArticle 36, of the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185,

193 (1999).
102See William Aceves, Treaties-Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations-Consular
Access to DetachedNationals-HabeasCorpus-AntiterrorismandEffective Death PenaltyAct

of 1996, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 87, 90 (1998) (suggesting that "failure to provide consular access
to detained nationals [alone] should be viewed as prejudicial on its face").
,o See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 88-91 (quoting Article 36, 2).
,0 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, El derecho a law informaci n sobre la assistencia
consular en el marco de las garant as del debido proceso legal, Opinion consultiva OC-16/99/
de I de Octubre de 1999, solicitada por los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion].
05

John Quigley, ProceduralLimitations on Capital Punishment: The Case of Foreign

Nationals,6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 523 (2000).
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framer's reasoning for adding "without delay." Under that theory, "[a]
detainee makes decisions immediately upon arrest that may significantly affect
the case, such as whether to make a statement, and whether to retain
counsel."' 6 Thus, both the framers and the court viewed the "without delay"
clause as indispensable.
The U.S. Ninth Circuit District Court has also proclaimed that information
must be communicated immediately upon arrest.' O However, neither the
Inter-American court nor the Ninth Circuit court has any binding effect upon
the ICJ's decision. The ICJ did not decide the precise meaning of without
delay in its opinion for the case as it was not necessary to the Court finding the
United States violated its treaty obligations.'°8 Although "without delay" did
not have any significant effect on the outcome of this case, the ICJ should have
discussed its meaning to set more precise guidelines for parties to follow in
carrying out their Article 36 obligations.
4. FederalGovernment Involvement
The Executive Branch of the U.S. federal government has a duty to comply
with treaties. The text of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
states that the Executive Branch of the U.S. national government has an
obligation and the necessary authority to ensure that national agreements are
faithfully executed.'" This supports Germany's argument that a number of
steps" could have been taken by the U.S. Executive Branch to stay Walter
LaGrand's execution and stop the repeated violations of the VCCR by
American states. Placing an affirmative duty on the U.S. Executive Branch
should decrease the problems in the state courts.
The general practice of the United States on this issue of leaving the Article
36 obligations for its states to implement insufficiently satisfies the promise
of the United States to implement Article 36 rights into its criminal system

'06Id. at 524; see id. at 522-23 (adding that, in the court's view, "a receiving state may not
refrain from taking action to ascertain the individual's nationality and then justify its failure to
inform the individual of the right to consular access on the grounds of a lack of knowledge of
an individual's nationality").
Id. at 523; see U.S. v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (D.V.I. 1999).
o See generally Final Judgment, supra note 10.
'o See Restatement (Third) of the F.R.L. of the U.S. § 11, cmt. c.
IoSee Aceves, supra note 93, at 302. One being the United States suing the individual state
on behalf of the foreign government to get around the United States' Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution that does not allow individuals or foreign nations sue a state
without its permission, see id.
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when it ratified the VCCR. The United States' inaction in such matters
essentially amounts to its signature on the VCCR being a legal fiction.". "The
United States, which at home usually likes to portray itself as the refuge and
worldwide as the guardian of human rights, should finally be forced to adhere
to international agreements not only when it wants to.""' This sentiment was
echoed in the case before the ICJ. "The domestic law defense is a weak
argument, as it cannot be an excuse for non-compliance with international law.
It cannot preclude the full effect of a treaty in internal law, nor can it serve as
an excuse for the violation of international law.""' 3 The world had thus called
for an end to the violations of the VCCR by the United States.
The ICJ held that the United States could not rely on the fact that the
LaGrands did not plead Article 36 until after they were barred by the U.S.
procedural default rule since the United States had itself failed to carry out its
Article 36 obligation to inform the LaGrands. "4 The Court found it immaterial
whether the LaGrands would have used the consular assistance, whether
Germany would have helped the LaGrands, or whether a different verdict
would have been rendered." 5 The ICJ held it was sufficient that Article 36
conveyed these rights and Germany was prevented from exercising them by
6
the United States."
C. The Human Right Debate on Article 36
Article 36 of the VCCR confers an individual human right on the arrested
foreign national, as well as a diplomatic right on the sending state of the
foreign national. It was argued that the United States did not intend to confer
a private right of action on foreign criminal defendants when it ratified the
VCCR;1 7 notwithstanding the United States' intent when it became a party to

"' See Nicholas Roznovsky, Long Arm of the Law, U. WIRE, Nov. 30, 2000, availablein

LEXIS News Library, News Group File. "If the United States cannot enforce the Vienna
Convention's provisions in its own states, then its signature on the document is worthless." Id.
"' Wolfgang Krach & Georg Mascolo, Superpower on Trial, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION,
Oct. 30, 2000, available in 2000 WL 29042329.
, Sanja Djajic, The Effect ofInternationalCourt ofJustice Decisionson MunicipalCourts

in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 102 (1999)
(arguing, also at 93, that procedural deficiencies cause arbitrary deprivation of life where
national legal requirements are not fulfilled).
"1 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, I 58-60.
..See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 174.
116 See id.

"7 See Vadnais, supra note 98, at 311 (adding that the Supreme Court of the United States
is justified in its hesitance to extend fundamental rights to foreign national deprived of their
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the VCCR, several scholars examining the VCCR believe it to confer
individual human rights on foreign nationals."' For example, while the
language of Article 36 may not appear to guarantee any individual rights, the
history of the negotiations for the treaty strongly suggest individual rights were
created." 9
Notwithstanding the right to consular assistance being understood as an
individual and human right under the VCCR, it is believed to be an individual
and human right on its own under customary law.' Moreover, "international
human rights have been supported by (United States] courts under the doctrine
of customary international law."'2 1 Customary human rights embodied in
international agreements prevent discrimination of foreign nationals and
guarantee access to all necessary evidence in preparation of their criminal
defense.'

'

The violation of the LaGrands' right to consular assistance without delay
was itself prejudicial and discriminatory. Notwithstanding the VCCR,
"International law conceives that an important element of a fair trial, when the
proceeding includes aliens, is the right to have the advice of consul."'"
Prominent international theory supports VCCR Article 36 rights as individual
human rights.
The ICJ held that Article 36, paragraph 1 conveyed individual rights,

finding significant the language referring to "his rights" within the treaty. 24
The ICJ, however, declined to discuss whether Article 36, paragraph 1

Article 36 rights because "the executive branch has taken the position that criminal defendants
have no Article 36 cause of action in domestic courts." citing Albright's letter to the Governor
of Arizona to voluntarily stay).
"' See, e.g., Victor Uribe, Consuls at Work: UniversalInstruments of Human Rights and
Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 375 (1997)
(arguing Article 36 rights as human rights derive from several international treaties).
19 See Springrose, supra note 101, at 190. The author believes this right should be a
fundamental right under the United States Constitution and asserts that Americans think this
right to be fundamental when they are arrested in foreign countries. See id. at 200.
20 See Unbe, supra note 118, at 84.
Id.
See Uribe, supra note 118, at 424.
1,3 See Djajic, supra note 113, at 91 (explaining an international due process standard).
121
'

The violations of other human rights, such as the right to access to a consul,
the right to a fair trial, and others, are separate human rights issues. However,

their sole existence generates arguments that prove the violation of the right
to life through the imposition of a death sentence that was invalid under
international law.
Id. at92.
124 See Final Judgment, supra note 10,
77.
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conferred a human right as it was unnecessary after holding the LaGrands had
individual rights under the treaty and Germany could invoke those rights on
behalf of the LaGrands in the ICJ. ' The Court also held Article 36, paragraph
2 conveyed individual rights on the LaGrands, which became significant in the
Court's decision of the U.S. procedural default rule."
D. The United States Should Have Complied with the Order in the Case
The ICJ concluded that orders on provisional measures have binding
effect. "' 7 The court further held that the specific Order of March 3, 1999 was
binding in character and created a legal obligation for the United States. ' The
court interpreted Article 41 of its statute as giving it the authority to issue
Provisional Measures orders in accordance with principles of customary
international law.'29 By comparing the text of the English and French versions
of the statute as well as its prepartory history, the court concluded the drafters'
intent was to make ICJ orders binding upon the States. '° The court also relied
on a universally accepted principle that parties to a dispute arising out of
convention must abstain from any measures capable of exercising a prejudicial
effect on the case. '' The court also found that nothing in the3United
Nations
2
charter precluded a conclusion that ICJ orders were binding.
Notwithstanding the binding nature of ICJ Provisional Measures Orders,
some commentators believe the United States could have taken more steps to
stay the execution."'3 "Under international law, and under the [United States]
Constitution, the Court's order had the same character and status as a United
States treaty obligation as does the Statute of the Court underlying the
Order."'34 The United States argued it had complied with the order when it

" See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 78.
Final Judgment, supra note 10, 84.
127See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 109.
12 See Final Judgment, supra note 10,
110.
19 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 99.
Io See Final Judgment, supra note 10, IN 102, 106.
'31 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 1 103 (citing Electricity Company of Sofia
and
Bulgaria, Order of 5 December 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199).
131 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 108.
'" See Vazquez, supra note 96; See also Damrosch, supra note 86, at 699 (arguing the
Breard order as binding as the United States should have complied better).
14 See Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, US. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 679,680; see also Vazquez, supra note 96, at 689 ("The distinction between binding
and nonbinding international orders seems too flimsy to support a judgment about the
constitutional allocation of the authority to execute treaties.").
126 See
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took all reasonable steps it could to stay the execution; however, one
suggestion was asserted that the Executive Branch of the United States
government could have complied with the order and stayed Walter LaGrand's
execution."'" The United States President could have issued an executive order
to postpone an execution that entailed international consequences.l" Beyond
the United States President's authority, the United States Attorney-General or
Secretary of State could have taken independent action in federal court to
obtain an order against the governor of Arizona; an order to honor United
States' treaty obligations and stay the execution.'37
The ICJ agreed and found that the United States failed to comply with the
Order of March 3, 1999 by not taking all measures at its disposal to stay
Walter LaGrand's execution.13 The court conceded that U.S. authorities had
very little time to act to comply with the order but held that steps taken by the
United States were nonetheless inadequate.'
The court noted that the mere
transmission of the Order to the Governor of Arizona with no comment,
coupled with the U.S. Solicitor General's statement that orders were nonbinding and the failure to effectuate the Arizona Clemency Board's recommendation to stay the execution, were wholly insufficient to discharge the
obligation. 40
E. Remedies Available in the Case
The draft article' 4 ' for the VCCR recognized four types of remedies for a
violation ofany VCCRrights including restitution, satisfaction, compensation,
and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.4 2 Germany asked for

"3 See id. at 681 (suggesting, for one, the United States President could make a stronger,
mandatory representation to the individual state's governor to stay the execution).
36 See Vazquez, supra note 96, at 689 (stating the President has the authority to act when he

believes it to be in the national interest to do so and precedent for this authority exists in the
foreign affairs power of the United States President).
" See Henkin, supra note 134, at 681 (citing Sanitary Dist. v. U.S., 262 U.S. 405,425-26
(1925) (U.S. may bring a bill in equity to enjoin action by state agency in order, inter alia, to
carry out U.S. treaty obligation).
...
See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 111.
"' See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 111-12. The ICJ found Germany's timing not to be
a problem and held Germany was entitled to challenge the alleged failure of the United States
to comply with the March 3rd Order. Id. at 57.
94o See Final Judgment, supra note 10,
115.
i4, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N.
Doc A/48/10, reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., pt. 2, at 54.
,42 See Aceves, supra note 93, at 311-12.
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satisfaction" 3 and for assurances and guarantees. The United States argued
against availability and appropriateness of the latter remedy; however, the ICJ
may award that type under the VCCR. The Court may fashion the exact
remedy Germany asked for since the VCCR allows it.'" While the United
States argued the claims should be inadmissible because Germany's own
practice fails to conform to the standards it demands of the United States in
this litigation, the ICJ held that it does not follow that the remedies for a
violation of Article 36 must be identical in all situations, and noted that an
apology may be insufficient in some severe cases."" Based on all facts and
circumstances discussed in the case thus far, the ICJ understood the need for
assurances of non-repetition.'"
The ICJ held that an apology was an insufficient remedy for this case; 47
however, the court considered the commitment expressed by the United States
to ensure implementation of the specific measures under Article 36, paragraph
1(b) had to be regarded as meeting Germany's request for a general assurance
of non-repetition.'" The court did not have the authority under the Vienna
Convention treaty to require a guarantee of non-repetition from the United
States." 9 The court refused to hold that U.S. law, either substantive or
procedural, was inherently inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the
United States in the treaty; s however, the court did place a future duty on the
United States to address violations of the Vienna Convention should they still
occur in spite of its efforts to achieve compliance.' The court stated that a
future breach of Article 36 by the United State against a German national
would require that the United States offer more than an apology.1 2 Especially
in regards to convictions imposing severe penalties, the United States would
have an obligation to review and reconsider the conviction in5 light
of the
3
States.
United
the
to
left
be
to
means
of
choice
the
with
breach,

Id. at 312 (stating satisfaction may take the form of an apology).
See Springrose, supra note 101, at 204..
145 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 163.
146See id.
47 See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 1123.
'4 See Final Judgment, supra note 10,1 124.
149See id.
'SOSee Final Judgment, supra note 10,1 125.
ISI See Final Judgment, supra note 10, 1127.
152 See Final Judgment, supra note 10,
125.
tS See id.
43

'44
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F. Consequences of Violatingan InternationalTreaty
While the United States ratified Article 94 of the United Nations Charter,'54
the United States, among many other nations, has resisted the IC's exercise
ofjurisdictionby refusing to appear or participate, and has resisted conforming
to an ICJ order or judgment.'
No ICJ judgment or order has ever been
enforced by the United Nations Security Council.' 56 Therefore, it is highly
unlikely the United States will be forced to comply with an ICJ judgment
against it in the case; however, the United States will still feel a magnitude
of
157
pressure to adhere to the decision from a variety of worldwide sources.
Pressure will emerge from the reciprocal nature of international obligations.
The United States cannot continue to violate the VCCR and still expect other
countries to abide by it."' Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated,
"[The execution] could be seen as a denial by the United States of the
significance of international law and the [International] Court's processes in
its international relations and thereby limit [the United States'] ability to
ensure that Americans are protected when living or traveling abroad."1 59 Many
observers have also asserted their fear of how continued violations will hurt
the United States.' ° Not only will United States international travelers be

15
15'

U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
See Jonathan I.Charney, CompromissingClausesandthe Jurisdictionofthe International

Court ofJustice, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 855, 860-70 (Oct. 1987).
,6 Id. at 860.
,S7Id. at 860. "Yet the impact of ICJ involvement in a dispute may extend well beyond any
such specific court orders." Id.
'58 See Gregory Dean Gisvold, Strangersin a Strange Land: Assessing the Fateof Foreign
Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN.-L. REv. 771
(1994). If the United States desires foreign countries to honor the rights of its citizens under the
VCCR, it must do the same. See id.
' See Letter from Madeleine AIbright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James Gilmore, Governor

of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998) (expressing her concerns in a letter to Virginia's governor and
requesting a stay of execution for Angel Breard, Paraguay's citizen executed without being told
of his Article 36 rights by U.S. authorities, which the governor denied).
'6 See Richard C. Dieter, InternationalPerspectiveon the Death Penalty:A CostlyIsolation
for the US., Death Penalty Information Center, Oct. 1999, available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/internationreport.html (visited Oct. 23,2001) (105 countries have stopped

using the death penalty. "[B]y executing citizens from other countries who were not afforded
the simplest protections U.S. citizens routinely expect abroad ...
the U.S. is showing disrespect
for international human rights law both at home and abroad." The potential costs to the United
States include loss of leadership and prestige, and endangerment of the rights of United States
citizens abroad.); see also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir.) (Butzner, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) ("U.S. citizens are scattered around the
world... Their freedom and safety are seriously endangered if state officials failure to honor
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harmed, but the United States is constantly in need of cooperation from other
countries in areas such as defense, drug enforcement, economics, and human
rights. 6" Continuous violations of the treaty will erode the United States' role
in international relations unless the United States acts to stop it quickly.
Without enforcement, refusing to implement the ICJ's decision will only
harm the United States' reputation; nonetheless, reputation can mean
everything in international affairs. "A reputation for playing fast and loose
with treaty commitment can only do harm to [the United States'] capacity to
be a leader in the post-Cold war World."' 62 Not only will United States'
credibility be undermined and its international relations harmed, 63 but "the
[United States] position in seeking remedies before the [ICJ] in future cases
may deteriorate due to the manifest disrespect for this institution.""'
Therefore, the United States will not only be harmed through decreased
protection of its citizens abroad, but also through reduced support in
international courts.
Amnesty International requested that all nations worldwide "immediately
undertake a series of measures in defense of the fundamental human and legal
rights of all foreign nationals under sentence of death in the [United States]." 65
Since Amnesty International seeks redress for U.S. violations of Article 36
consular rights,"e the United States may continue to battle in legal and
diplomatic fights long after the LaGrand situation and ICJ case are over.
While some countries may take reasonable legal and diplomatic action against
the United States, others could retaliate in more harmful ways as the
introductory story illustrated. 67 This note does not suggest it will be easy for

the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their example. Public officials should bear in
mind that "International laws are founded upon mutuality and reciprocity.').
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Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J.INT'L L. 458,462 (1998); see
also Roznosky, supra note 111 ("If America wants to continue being the leader of the free
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6' UnitedStates ofAmerica: Worlds Apart: Violations ofthe Rights of ForeignNationals
on Death Row, Amnesty International, July 2000 (visited Oct. 24, 2001), available at http://
www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/SUM/25110100.htm [hereinafter Amnesty]; See also
Vazquez, supranote 96, at 523 ("Other countries may question the broader commitment of the
United States to its treaty obligations and the rule of law.").
'" See Djajic, supra note 113, at 108.
165 See Amnesty, supra note 163.
166Id.
167See Aceves, supra note 93, at 324 (stating "other countries [could] refuse to provide
[United States] nationals with consular notification and access when detained").
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the United States to change its laws and policies to accommodate the VCCR
sufficiently. Yet, for the sake of its citizens, the United States must try its best.
G. Changes the United States Could Implement to Satisfy its Obligations
Under the VCCR
The United States must experiment with tactics that will improve its
compliance with VCCR Article 36. The burden to give satisfactory attempt
to the Article 36 rights cannot be left on U.S. courts. 68 While limitations on
what Congress may do exist in the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the ability
to persuade the separate states to adhere to the VCCR.' 69 The U.S. Executive
Branch may threaten the violating states with lawsuits on the behalf of foreign
countries' or Congress may reward states that have implemented effective
notification programs."'
The United States needs to continually stress to state and local law
enforcement agencies the need to notify foreign citizens of their Article 36
rights as soon as they are arrested.'
Most importantly, the separate state
governments must be made aware that repeated violations of the VCCR will
endanger their own citizens when traveling abroad.
IV. CONCLUSION

As both parties asserted, this decision will have far reaching effects: not
just as a battle of who is right in interpretation of a treaty between two parties,
but as a chance for the ICJ to declare an interpretation that will affect all
current and future parties to the VCCR. Since the Court held for Germany and
accepted Germany's request for assurances, the United States will face the
challenge of whether to honor the judgment and how to do so.
While Germany asserted many worthy arguments, the argument seemed
based more in ideal theory than practicality. On the other hand, the United
States may have felt the law was on its side; yet, it lacked the emotion and
compassion of some of Germany's statements.
If the Court had held it had no jurisdiction to decide the case, it would have
harmed the Court's jurisdiction under numerous other treaties and it would

1" See Vadnais, supra note 98, at 312.
169 Id.
,70See Aceves, supra note 102, at 91.
171 Id.
...
See Gisvold, supra note 158, at 799.
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have only been a small victory for the United States since criticism of U.S.
practice would unlikely have subsided.
No nation is satisfied with the way the United States currently tries to
comply with the VCCR. As much as foreign nationals may have cause to fear
in coming to America where they may not speak the language or know any of
its laws, U.S. citizens who want to travel abroad may decide not to take those
exotic trips until the United States begins fulfilling all its obligations under the
VCCR. One could only imagine the anxiety a person would feel if arrested in
a country where they do not speak the language or know the customs.
Reading the Oral Arguments of the case, it may seem as though the parties
just want to mud-sling instead of really working through this dispute by giving
the VCCR the status it was intended to have when ratified in 1963. The
pattern followed by the United States in international court is to plead entirely
contradictory theories based on whether it is the plaintiff or defendant in an
ICJ action. Every nation wants its laws enforced abroad but they hide behind
the screen of sovereignty when attacked for violating another nation's law.
Today's world is global in every way: internet, travel, trade, etc. If the
nations cannot abide by the treaties they negotiate, and ifno international body
can enforce them, states will continually find it hard to protect their citizens.
The ICJ has no authority to enforce this decision, but it can put pressure on the
United States' reputation in order to have it comply with the VCCR. In
today's international relations, with treaties and orders being unenforceable,
a country's pledge is all it has to give to other nations. These pledges should
not be taken lightly.
The ICJ finding for Germany on all of its claims and declaring that ICJ
Provisional Measures Orders are binding was an important first step in
increasing compliance with treaties and pressuring Nation States to honor their
obligations and the ICJ's authority.

